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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
To measure the trade restrictiveness of a country’s trade policy regime, one needs to overcome
two important aggregation hurdles: aggregation of diﬀerent forms of trade policies and aggregation
across goods with very diﬀerent economic importance.
Regarding the ﬁrst aggregation problem, trade policy can take many diﬀerent forms: tariﬀs,
quotas, non-automatic licensing, antidumping duties, technical regulations, monopolistic measures,
subsidies, etc. How can one summarize in a single measure the trade restrictiveness of a 10 percent
tariﬀ, a 1000 tons quota, a complex non-automatic licensing procedure and a $1 million subsidy?
Often the literature relies on outcome measures, e.g., import shares. The rationale is that import
shares summarize the impact of all these trade policy instruments. The problem is that they
also measure diﬀerences in tastes, macroeconomic shocks, and other factors, which should not be
attributed to trade policy. Another approach that is also often followed is to simply rely on tariﬀ
data and hope that all other instruments are (perfectly) correlated with tariﬀs. These are obviously
unsatisfactory solutions. A more adequate approach to solve this ﬁrst problem is to bring all types
of trade policy instruments into a common metric.1
Regarding the second aggregation problem, trade policy is set at the tariﬀ line level and there
are often more than 5000 tariﬀ lines in a typical tariﬀ schedule. How can one summarize all this
information in one aggregate and economically meaningful measure? Commonly used aggregation
procedures include simple average, import-weighted averages and frequency or coverage ratios; none
of which has a sound theoretical basis. For example, imports subject to high protection rates are
likely to be small and therefore will be attributed small weights in an import-weighted aggregation,
which would underestimate the restrictiveness of those tariﬀs. In the extreme case, goods subject
to prohibitively high tariﬀs have the same weight as goods subject to zero tariﬀs: a zero weight.
Similarly, when computing simple average tariﬀs, very low tariﬀs on economically meaningless goods
1This is, for example, what the IMF’s trade restrictiveness index does by implementing the following procedure.
First, countries with an average tariﬀ below a certain threshold are open and therefore score only 1 point, whereas
countries with higher average tariﬀs score a higher number of points. Second, countries with a share of tariﬀ lines
aﬀected by non-tariﬀ barriers below a certain threshold are open and score 1 point, and countries with higher shares
score a higher number of points. So for example, an average tariﬀ of 3 percent scores 1 point and when only 5 percent
of tariﬀ lines are aﬀected by NTBs the country also scores 1 point, for a total of 2 point on the TRI. Diﬀerent types of
trade policy instruments have been brought to a common metric. The problem is that it is not clear why a 3 percent
average tariﬀ s h o u l db ee q u i v a l e n tt oa5p e r c e n tN T Bc o v e r a g e .T h e s ea r ea d - h o cc r i t e r i aw i t hn oe c o n o m i cb a s i s .would downward bias this measure of trade restrictiveness.2
These two major hurdles are solved in the work of Anderson and Neary (1992, 1994, 1996, 2003
and 2004) on trade restrictiveness on which this paper is based. Their work, and ours, solves the
ﬁrst problem by transforming all the information on non-tariﬀ barriers into a price equivalent, i.e.,
it answers the following question: what is the impact that these NTBs have on the domestic price
of imported goods? This is called an Ad-Valorem Equivalent (AVE), and is directly comparable to
a tariﬀ. Adopting the framework of Anderson and Neary, we solve the second problem by using
theoretically sound aggregation procedures that answer very speciﬁc questions regarding: a) the
trade distortions imposed by each country’s trade policies on itself, b) on its trading partners, and
c) the trade restrictiveness imposed by the rest of the world on each country’s export bundle. The
questions are answered within a simple and empirically tractable model that allow us to measure
the three trade restrictiveness indices for a large number of developing countries.
Thus, the trade restrictiveness indicators in this paper answer very speciﬁc questions.3 When
interested in the trade distortions that the country imposes on itself, the aggregation procedure
answers the following question: What is the equivalent uniform tariﬀ t h a tw o u l dk e e pr e a li n c o m e( o r
welfare) constant?. This corresponds to Anderson and Neary’s (1994, 1996) Trade Restrictiveness
Index (TRI). While the TRI is an excellent indicator of the degree of domestic ineﬃciency caused by
the domestic trade regime, it provides little information regarding the trade restrictiveness faced by
exporters among their trading partners. For example, if a particular tariﬀ or NTB on beef imports
in the European Union causes important domestic ineﬃciencies, this should not be a concern for EU
t r a d i n gp a r t n e r si ft h i sd o e sn o ts i g n i ﬁcantly aﬀect EU imports. When interested in the extent to
which trade distortions limit imports from the rest of the world, the aggregation procedure answers
the following question: What is the equivalent uniform tariﬀ of country M that would keep imports
of country M at their observed levels?. This second indicator is Anderson and Neary’s (2003)
MTRI. It is here labeled Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) to account for diﬀerences in
methodologies. Finally, if one is interested in the barriers faced by exporters in the rest of the
2For example, assume that there are two tariﬀ lines for cement: one for ﬁnished cement, which is very costly to
transport internationally and one for clinker which represents 80 percent of cement’s value added, but is cheap to
transport. Finished cement has a 0 percent tariﬀ and clinker a 100 percent tariﬀ.T h e s i m p l e a v e r a g e t a r i ﬀ is 50
percent, whereas most of what is imported pays a 100 percent tariﬀ.
3As will become clearer, one single indicator cannot provide a measure of the trade distortions a country imposes
on itself while simultaneously capturing the trade distortions imposed on its trading partners.
2world, the relevant question is: What is the equivalent uniform tariﬀ faced by exporters of country
X in the rest of the world that would keep exports of country X at their observed levels?.T h i sc a n
be seen as the mirror image (from the exporter’s perspective) of the OTRI and it is labeled Market
Access OTRI (MA-OTRI). The OTRI and MA-OTRI can be calculated bilaterally to capture the
trade restrictiveness that countries impose on each other. By deﬁnition the MA-OTRI faced by
country X on its exports to country M will be equal to the OTRI imposed by country M on its
imports from country X.
Instead of using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the trade restric-
tiveness indices as in Anderson and Neary (1994, 2003), we follow a more econometric intensive
approach, which allows us to avoid biases associated with the necessary aggregation of tariﬀ lines
into a few industries when building a CGE. Given the heterogeneity of levels of protection within
industries, not including some feedback mechanisms provided by the CGE approach seems a cost
worth paying. Feenstra (1995) shows that if one focuses on ﬁrst order eﬀects (and ignores some
of the feedbacks), the TRI can be approximated by the squared root of a weighted average of the
squares of the level of protection at the tariﬀ line level (which include AVEs of NTBs). The weights
are an increasing function of import shares, import demand elasticities and levels of protection.
We show in this paper (following Feenstra, 1995) that the OTRI is also a weighted average of the
applied levels of protection where the weights are functions of import shares and import demand
elasticities. Finally, the MA-OTRI is also a weighted average of the applied levels of protection
faced in the rest of the world (across tariﬀ lines and trading partners). The weights are an in-
creasing function of the exporter’s export shares and importers’ import demand elasticities. Note
that the weights of the TRI, OTRI and MA-OTRI do not take the value of zero in the presence
of prohibitive levels of protection, unless import demand is inﬁnitely inelastic. This overcomes the
problems of import-weighted averages mentioned above.
In order to compute the trade restrictiveness measures (TRI, OTRI and MA-OTRI), one needs
information on tariﬀs, but more importantly AVEs of NTBs and elasticities of import demand at
the tariﬀ line level. The latter were estimated in Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004).
For NTBs, several papers in the literature have estimated their incidence using diﬀerent method-
ologies and data (see Deardorﬀ and Stern, 1997). These include frequency and coverage type mea-
sures (e.g., Nogues et al., 1986 or OECD, 1995), price comparison measures (e.g., Andriamananjara
3et al., 2004 and Bradford, 2003), and quantity-impact measures (using NTB data as in Leamer,
1990 and Harrigan, 1993 or as residuals of gravity-type equations as in Mayer and Zignago, 2003).
However, to our knowledge, there exists no attempt to estimate those in a consistent way for a
wide variety of countries at the tariﬀ line level. Because trade policy is determined at the tariﬀ
line level (Men Shirts made of cotton) and not at the more aggregate industry level (Apparel), it
is important to measure its restrictiveness at the most disaggregated level. Otherwise aggregation
bias could lead to misleading conclusions.4
We estimate AVEs of NTBs as follows. Using data on two broad types of NTBs —Core NTBs
(price and quantity control measures, technical regulations, as well as monopolistic measures, such
as single channel for imports) and agricultural domestic support— at the tariﬀ line level for each
country, we estimate their impact on imports following Leamer’s (1990) comparative advantage
approach (see also Harrigan, 1993 and Treﬂer, 1993). The logic of this approach is to predict
imports using factor endowments and observe its deviations in the presence of NTBs. This is done
f o re a c hH Ss i x - d i g i tt a r i ﬀ line in which at least one country has some type of NTB (around 4800
tariﬀ lines). The estimated impact of NTBs on imports varies by country (according to country
speciﬁc factor endowments). We then convert the quantity impact of NTBs on imports into a
price equivalent(or AVE) by simply moving along the import demand curve using import demand
elasticities estimated earlier.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology used
to estimate ad-valorem equivalents of NTBs, whereas section 3 presents the methodology used to
estimate the trade restrictiveness indices. Section 4 describes the data, whereas section 5 describes
the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
4For example, imagine that the Apparel industry is composed of two tariﬀ lines: shirts made of cotton and shirts
made of synthetic fabrics. Assume that country A imports an equal amount of both types of shirts. It has a tariﬀ of
100 on cotton shirts, for which the import demand is perfectly inelastic and no tariﬀso ns y n t h e t i cf a b r i c st h a th a da
fairly elastic import demand. Clearly, the tariﬀ structure of country A does not impose any welfare cost. However if
one were to aggregate cotton and synthetic fabrics into Apparel, one would ﬁnd that the (average) 50 percent tariﬀ
on Apparel has a welfare cost, given that import demand for Apparel is not perfectly inelastic.
42 Estimating AVEs of NTBs
To obtain AVEs of NTBs we ﬁrst estimate the quantity-impact of NTBs on imports and then we
turn into the transformation of quantity eﬀects into price eﬀects.
2.1 Estimating the impact of NTBs on imports
The theoretical foundation for this kind of studies is the n-good n-factor general equilibrium model
with log-linear utilities and log-linear constant returns to scale technologies (see Leamer, 1988 and
Leamer, 1990). One of the speciﬁcations commonly used (e.g., Leamer, 1990, Harrigan, 1993,






n,c Coren,c + βDS
n,clogDSn,c + εn,clog[(1 + tn,c)] + µn,c (1)
where mn,c is import value of good n in country c;5 αn are product dummies that capture any good
speciﬁce ﬀect; Ck
c are k variables that provide country characteristics; more precisely as in Leamer’s
(1990) comparative advantage approach we used relative factor endowments (agricultural land over
G D P ,c a p i t a lo v e rG D Pa n dl a b o ro v e rG D P ) ,a sw e l la sG D Pt oc a p t u r ee c o n o m i cs i z e .W ea l s o
introduced two gravity type variables: a dummy for islands and a measure of the average distance
to the world of each countries (i.e., the import-weighted distance to each trading partner); αk
c are
parameters in front of the variables that capture country characteristics; Coren,csi sad u m m y
variable indicating the presence of a core NTB; logDSn,c is the log of agricultural domestic support,
which is continuous and measured in dollars (for a description of NTB data, see subsection 3.1.1);
βCore
n,c is the parameter that captures the impact that a core NTB imposed on good n in country
c has on imports of good n in country c; similarly βDS
n,c is the parameter that captures the impact
that agricultural domestic support granted to good n in country c has on imports of good n in
country c. tn,c is the ad-valorem tariﬀ on good n in country c; εn,c is the import demand elasticity;
and ﬁnally µn,c is an i.i.d. error term.
This model allows for both tariﬀs and NTBs to deter trade with eﬀects that vary by importing
5Note that (1) is only deﬁned for strictly positive values of mc,n.I f mc,n =0 ,t h el o g (mc,n) is not deﬁned. To
avoid sample bias we added 1 to all mc,n values (which are measured in thousand of dollars).
5country and good. Given that the impact of tariﬀs on imports depends exclusively on the import
demand elasticities and that these have been estimated earlier for each HS 6 digit tariﬀ line in 117
countries (see Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2004), we can substitute these estimates into (1) instead
of trying to estimate them again. This does not only allow us to avoid imposing any structure on
the estimation of those parameters (to avoid running out of degrees of freedom), but also solves for
the endogeneity of tariﬀs (and import demand elasticities) to tariﬀsa sd i s c u s s e di nT r e ﬂer (1993)
or Lee and Swagel (1997). This is achieved by sending the tariﬀ variable (and the now “known”
parameters) to the left-hand-side. This constrained speciﬁcation may introduce heteroscedasticity
in the error term κn,c given that import demand elasticities have been estimated with error and this
error in the measurement of the elasticities can be associated with measurement error in NTBs. A
White correction could be undertaken to solve for this.6 After substituting the estimated elasticities
and sending the tariﬀ term to the left-hand-side, Equation (1) becomes:





n,c Coren,c + βDS
n,clogDSn,c + κn,c (2)
According to equation (2), the impact of NTBs (core and domestic support) varies across
countries and tariﬀ lines (i.e., βs have subscripts n and c). Given that the international data on
NTBs does not have adequate time variation, our sample is essentially a cross section of HS 6 digit
tariﬀ lines and products. Thus some structure would have to be imposed on the β parameters to
allow them to vary across tariﬀ lines and countries without running out of degrees of freedom. We
will therefore allow them to have a product speciﬁc impact and the country speciﬁci m p a c tw i l l
depend on the variables that capture country characteristics; more precisely on endowments as in
Leamer’s (1990) comparative advantage approach:
6Alternatively, one could try to correct parametrically using the information on standard errors, but it is not



















ns are product (i.e., tariﬀ line) speciﬁcp a r a m e t e r st ob ee s t i m a t e d .T h ec o u n t r yv a r i -
ations comes from the interaction with the comparative-advantage variables. Substituting (3) and
(4) into (2) we get:

















c )logDSn,c + κn,c (5)
Given that there are: 4545 goods at the HS 6 digit level on which at least one country in our
sample has an NTB; two diﬀerent types of NTBs and ﬁve coeﬃcients by type of NTB (the product
speciﬁc dummy and then 4 variables that capture country characteristics, the estimation in (5)
would involve estimating around 2 x 5 (4545)=45450 coeﬃcients. This is likely to be intractable if
we estimated these coeﬃcients in a single regression. We therefore opted for estimating this tariﬀ
line by tariﬀ line. The only drawback is a loss in the eﬃciency of these estimates, but it is largely
compensated by gains in programming and computing time. Thus we basically run 4545 equations
(5) and retrieve the relevant parameters from each of these regressions that allow us to compute
βCore
n,c and βDS
n,c according to (3) and (4).
An additional problem with the estimation of (5) is that NTBs are likely to be endogenous to
imports (and tariﬀs, or import demand elasticities). Indeed the political economy literature suggests
that all these may be determinants of NTBs. This endogeneity may bias the estimated impact of
NTBs on imports, and as shown by Treﬂer (1993) and Lee and Swagel (1997), the endogeneity
may actually lead to a downward bias in these estimates and therefore an underestimation of the
ad-valorem equivalent. The traditionally used instruments such as ﬁrm concentration (on the buyer
and seller side), or factor shares are not available at this level of disaggregation, so they will not
provide a way out of the endogeneity problem. Other potential instruments for NTBs suggested in
7the literature are exports or the past change in imports. These however are likely to be correlated
with imports and tariﬀs and therefore they may be not very good instrumental variables. An
additional instrument for core NTB is the GDP-weighted share of the 5 closest countries that
apply core NTB on product n; similarly the GDP-weighted share of domestic support provided to
good n by the 5 closest countries is used to instrument for DS.7 The idea is simple. Historical, legal
and cultural reasons may induce neighboring countries to impose similar types of NTBs on similar
products.8
Because core NTB is a dummy variable that just indicates the presence or absence of a particular
type of NTB on a particular good in a given country, the estimation method follows a Heckman
two-stage treatment eﬀect procedure. In the ﬁrst stage, we run 5000 probit equation on Core
NTBs (one for each product) explained by the instruments discussed above, to obtain the Mills
ratio (the ratio of the probability density function and the cumulative density function of each
observation). The second stage equation adds the Mills ratio of the probit model describing the
Core NTB treatment decision as an explanatory variable. For 6-digit HS goods in which at least
one country uses domestic support (around 158 HS 6 digit tariﬀ lines) the second stage involves an
instrumental variable estimation where domestic support is instrumented using the GDP-weighted
domestic support of the 5 closest neighbors for the given line, as well as exports and past changes
in imports.
The two-stage estimation allows us to obtain estimates of βcore
n,c and βcore
n,c . Note that theoretically
one expects them to be non-positive. They can be equal to zero if the NTB measure is not restrictive
(e.g., tariﬀs are the binding measure —see Anderson and Neary, 1992). Because in 13 percent of
the sample the unrestricted estimation provided positive estimates for βcore
n,c and βcore
n,c ,w h i c ha r e
economically meaningless, we actually constrained the estimation procedure so that βcore
n,c ≤ 0
βDS

















7The 5 closest countries are determined by measuring geographic distance between capitals.
8A test of overidentifying restrictions is conducted on these instruments and discussed in section 4.
8Note that after replacing (6) and (7) into (5) becomes non-linear both in the variables and the
parameters:

















c )logDSn,c + κn,c (8)
Thus our estimate of the impact of Core NTBs and agricultural domestic support on imports
(βCore
n,c and βCore
n,c ) are obtained by estimating (8) using non-linear least squares.9
2.2 Estimating ad-valorem equivalents of NTBs
To make NTBs comparable with ad-valorem tariﬀs, one needs to transform the quantity impact




where pd is the domestic price.10



































where qn,c as before are imported quantities (mn,c = pw
nqn,c), and aven,c,k is the ad-valorem equiv-
alent of NTB of type k i m p o s e do ng o o dn in country c. Thus solving (9) and (10) for aven,csw e
obtain:
9We also estimated these equations linearly using the speciﬁcation in (5). The correlation between the linear
and non-linear estimates of AVE is 0.86 for NTBs and 0.49 for domestic support, when the linear estimates provide
positive AVEs. The correlation is 0 when the linear estimates of AVEs are negative. Note that the average non-linear
AVE of core NTB point estimate is 15 percent for products that had a negative linear AVE, whereas it is 48 percent
for observations where the linear AVE was positive. In the case of agricultural domestic support, the similar ﬁgures
are 14 and 2 percent. Also, note that for those observations in which the estimated linear AVE is negative, the
non-linear estimates are statistically signiﬁcant in only 24 percent of these cases, which suggests that replacing the
negative estimates by zero wouldn’t be such a bad approximation.















Thus, the exact formula to calculate the ad-valorem equivalent will depend on whether the NTB














Ad-valorem equivalents will be calculated for the two types of NTBs at the product level (six
digit of the HS) in each country. An overall ad-valorem equivalent for the two types of NTBs at
the product level can be easily obtained by simply adding the 2 NTB components, and will simply
be denoted aven,c.
3 Estimating trade restrictiveness indices
The overall level of protection imposed by country c on imports of good n is given by:
Tn,c = aven,c + tn,c (15)
where Tn,c is the overall level of protection that country c imposes on imports of good n;a v e n,c is
the AVE of NTBs that country c imposes on imports of good n,a n dtn,c is tariﬀ applied by country
c on imports of good n.A d d i n gA V E so fN T B sa n dt a r i ﬀs to obtain an overall level of protection
on country c imports of good n in principle assumes that none of the protection instruments is
binding (Anderson and Neary, 1992).11 This is consistent with our AVE estimates, which need to
be interpreted as the impact that each NTB has on the volume of imported goods conditional on
11Alternatively, if there is any reason to believe that one of the four policy instruments is binding, then one can
deﬁne Tn,c as max(aven,c,t n,c).
10the presence of tariﬀs and other NTBs. This solves the ﬁrst aggregation problem mentioned in the
introduction; i.e., we have summarized in one indicator (Tn,c) the trade restrictiveness of diﬀerent
trade policy instruments applied on imports of a particular good (or tariﬀ line).
The solution to the second aggregation problem, i.e., the aggregation of levels of protection
across tariﬀ lines, will depend on the trade restrictiveness index that is being considered. Below,
we describe the methodologies to obtain the TRI, OTRI and MA-OTRI in turn.
3.1 Estimating TRIs
The TRI focuses on the trade distortions imposed by each country’s trade policies on itself. It uses
welfare as the relevant metric. It answers the following question: What is the uniform tariﬀ that
if applied to imports would leave home welfare unchanged? More formally, and assuming away









where Wn,c is the welfare associated with imports of good n in country c and W0
c is the current
level of aggregate welfare in country c given its protection structure. It is well known that in this












where mn,c is the import demand function in country c, pn,c is the price of good n in country c,
and εn,c is the elasticity of import demand. The ﬁrst equality linear approximate the Habergler
triangle between the free trade and the protection driven domestic price. The second equality
simply substitutes the slope of the import demand function by the more common notation where
import elasticities are used (it normalizes world prices to unity). Totally diﬀerentiating (16), using














Thus, the TRI is deﬁned as the weighted sum of squared protection levels, where weights are
11given by the slope of import demand functions in the ﬁrst equality and elasticity of import demand
and import levels in the second equality. These two are equal, except if imports are zero. The
TRI after the second equality would give a zero weight to the protection level of a good that is
not imported, whereas the TRI after the ﬁrst equality would give that good a positive weight.
In the empirical section we use the deﬁnition of TRI after the ﬁr s te q u a l i t yi n( 1 8 )t oa v o i dt h e
downward bias associated with the deﬁnition of TRI that uses imports and elasticities of import
demand. The slope of the import demand functions were obtained from the estimation of import
demand elasticities in Kee et al. (2004). Using the notation in Kee et al. (2004) it is easy to show
that dmn,c/dpn,c = −annGDPc − m2
n,c/GDPc − mn,c where ann is a price parameter in a translog
GDP function, and GDPc is the Gross Domestic Product of country c. Thus with information on
the slopes of import demand function and levels of protection at the tariﬀ line level one can easily
compute TRIs.
3.2 Estimating OTRIs
The OTRI focuses on the distortions imposed by each country’s trade policies on its import bundle.
It uses the aggregate import value as the relevant metric. It answers the following question: What
is the uniform tariﬀ that if imposed to home imports would leave aggregate imports unchanged?










c are current aggregate imports evaluated at world prices (again, we choose units so that










Thus, the OTRI is deﬁned as the weighted sum of protection levels, where weights are given
by the slope of import demand functions in the ﬁrst equality and elasticity of import demand and
import levels in the second equality. Again, in the empirical section we use the deﬁnition after the
ﬁrst equality to avoid the downward bias associated with the second deﬁnition in the presence of
prohibitive tariﬀ barriers.
12As shown by Anderson and Neary (2003), the OTRI, which uses the volume of trade as the
standard of reference, is always smaller than the TRI, that uses welfare as a metric. It is straight-
forward to show that OTRIc in (20) is smaller than TRIc in (18). Moreover as shown in Anderson
and Neary (2003) and thoroughly discussed in Anderson and Neary (2004), the tariﬀ dispersion is
likely to increase the relative size of TRI with respect to the OTRI.12
3.3 Estimating MA-OTRIs
The MA-OTRI is the mirror image of the OTRI. It focuses on the distortions that the rest of the
world imposes on each country’s export bundle. It uses export value as the relevant metric. It
answer the following question: What is the uniform tariﬀ that if imposed by all trading partners on














where xn,c,p are country c exports of good n to its trading partner p; Tn,c,p is the level of protection
faced by country c exports of good n in country p and x0
c are current aggregate exports of country
c evaluated at world prices (again, we choose units so that all world prices equal unity). Totally
diﬀerentiate (21), noting that noting that the change in exports of country c associated with the
level of protection in country p has to be equal to the change in imports of country p from country c
associated with the level of protection of country p.M o r ef o r m a l l y ,dxn,c,p/dpp,n,c = dmp,n,c/dpp,n,c.




















Thus, the MA-OTRI is deﬁned as the weighted sum of protection levels in the rest of the world.
If one uses the deﬁnition after the ﬁrst equality in (22) weights are given by the slope of import
demand functions in the rest of the world for imports originating in country c.I f o n e u s e s t h e
second equality in (22), weights are given by the elasticities of import demand and import from c in
the rest of the world. Again, in the empirical section we use the deﬁnition after the ﬁrst equality to
12See also footnote 7 in Feenstra, 1995.
13avoid the downward bias associated with the second deﬁnition in the presence of prohibitive tariﬀ
barriers.
As before, the slope of the import demand functions were obtained from the estimation of import
demand elasticities in Kee et al. (2004). Using the notation in Kee et al. (2004) it is easy to show
that dmp,n,c/dpp,n = −annGDPp −m2
p,n,c/GDPp−mp,n,c. If the formula in (22) were to be applied
as such, it could be severely bias. Indeed, it would include in the MA-OTRI of country c levels of
protection on products that c does not export at all. Thus in order to correct for this, the formula
in (22) is calculated conditional on the particular product representing more than 0.1 percent of
country c exports to the world. Obviously MA-OTRI can be calculated bilaterally to obtain the
level of trade restrictiveness that country p imposes on exports of country c. Again the formula after
the ﬁrst equality in (22) can be used to answer this question. But instead of summing over n and p
one would obviously only sum over p to obtain MA-OTRIc,p.B yd e ﬁnition MA-OTRIc,p = OTRIp,c.
To be economically meaningful, both would need to be estimated conditional on country c’s export
bundle to the world.
4D a t a
Tariﬀ data comes from diﬀerent sources. The main sources are the WTO’s IDB and UNCTAD’s
Trains. Because these sources rarely provide ad-valorem equivalents of speciﬁct a r i ﬀs, we use recent
computations available through the MAcMap database, developed jointly by ITC (UNCTAD-WTO,
Geneva) and CEPII (Paris).13 The tariﬀ data is for the most recent year for which there is data
available between 2000 and 2004. For more than half the countries the base year is 2003 or 2004 and
for only three countries the data is 2000 (Peru, Kazakhstan and Egypt). MAcMap also provided
us with a complete dataset of unilateral, bilateral and regional preferences which is an important
component when estimating MA-OTRIs.
Calls for improving the quality of NTBs data collection are regularly done (see Deardorﬀ and
Stern, 1997). This paper is no exception. As can be seen from the ﬁrst column of Table 1 the
best international data available to us (UNCTAD’s TRAINS) has quite an incomplete country
coverage (e.g., tariﬀ data is available for almost twice the number of countries for which NTB data
13See Bou¨ et et al. (2004) for a detailed description.
14is available). Moreover, the latest available year for which data is available varies signiﬁcantly
across countries (see second column of Table 1). To enhance country and time coverage would
allow to improve upon the precision of the estimates.
We obtained the entire UNCTAD TRAINS dataset through the World Bank’s WITS system.
This dataset contains detailed information on various types of NTBs (more than 30 diﬀerent types
of NTBs are identiﬁed). As discussed earlier, we included in our measure of Core NTBs: Price
control measures (UNCTAD Trains code 6100 6200 and 6300), Quantity restrictions (UNCTAD
Trains code 3100 3200 3300), Monopolistic Measures (UNCTAD’s Trains code 7000) and Technical
Regulations (UNCTAD’s Trains code 8100). The dataset was updated using information provided
by the WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews and in the case of the European Union by the EU Standard’s
Database built by Groupe d’Economie Mondiale at Science Po (Paris).14
The Core NTB variable used in the estimation of equation (8) takes the value 1 when a given
country imposes one of the Core NTB measures in a six digit tariﬀ line, and zero otherwise. This
obviously suﬀers from the drawback that we do not have a measure of the restrictiveness of a
particular NTB in a particular country. However, instead of making ad-hoc assumptions regarding
the restrictiveness of each NTB, we will rather rely on our estimation procedure to impute the
restrictiveness of each measure in each country. Rather than the statistician deciding how restrictive
is each measure we will let the data “decide” which type of NTB and in which country has the
most restrictive impact on imports.
The second type of NTB included is agricultural domestic support. This was obtained from
WTO members notiﬁcations during the period 1995-1998 (see Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga, 2004
for a discussion of the construction of this variable). Domestic support is measured in dollars and
is a continuous variable so it enters in log form in the estimation of (8). Only 158 tariﬀ lines at
the six digit of the HS are aﬀected by domestic support in at least one WTO member.15 One
may wonder why we do not use estimates of producer subsidy equivalents (PSE) as traditionally
done in the literature rather than estimating the AVE of these subsidies. The reason is twofold.
First, production data at this level of disaggregation is not available, which precludes calculating
PSE. Second, PSE cannot be directly compared to tariﬀsa st h e yo n l ya ﬀect the production side,
14See Shepherd (2004).
15One problem is that China’s agriculture support is not included as it was not a WTO member during that period.
15whereas tariﬀsa ﬀect both consumption and production. In other words a 10 percent PSE can be
much less restrictive than a 10 percent tariﬀ (it would only be as restrictive as the tariﬀ if the
domestic demand is inﬁnitely inelastic). So even if we had production levels, one would need to
transform the PSE into a tariﬀ equivalent (or some sort of Trade Restrictiveness Index in the spirit
of Anderson and Neary, 1996). In order to do so, we would need estimates of domestic supply and
demand elasticities, which do not exist at this level of disaggregation.
Import and export data comes from United Nations’ Comtrade (also available through WITS).
We took the average between 2001 and 2003 to smooth any year speciﬁc shock. If data is missing
for a particular country, then we use data for 2000 to calculate the average (Bhutan, Nigeria, Nepal
and Gabon). If there was no trade data reported to Comtrade during the 2000-2003 period, then
we mirror data from trading partners. This was the case for Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Egypt, Lao,
Mozambique, Chad and Vietnam.
Elasticities of import demand elasticities, or rather the slope of import demand functions (i.e.,
the price parameters ann) are borrowed from Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004).
5 Empirical Results
We ﬁrst discuss the estimates of AVEs of NTBs and we then turn into the calculation of trade
restrictiveness indices.
5.1 AVEs of NTBs
We run 4545 non-linear regressions (for each 6 digit HS category where at least one country imposes
e i t h e rac o r eN T B so rd o m e s t i cs u p p o r t )t oe s t i m a t et h ei m p a c tt h a tt h et w od i ﬀerent types of
Non-Tariﬀ-Barriers (NTBs) have on imports. The average adjusted R2 is 0.56; with a median
at 0.58, a maximum at 0.88, and a minimum at -0.05. The Kernel density estimate of the R2
estimates is given in Figure 1. There is less than 1 percent of the regression that had an R2 below
0.10, suggesting that the ﬁt of (8) was relatively good across the diﬀerent tariﬀ lines.
Each of these regressions provided us with 10 coeﬃcients that measure the impact of NTBs
(core and agricultural domestic support) on imports. These are the coeﬃcients in front of the two
NTB variables, interacted with a constant and four factor endowment variables that allow us to
16capture cross country variation in the estimates of the impact of NTBs on imports (these are GDP,
labor force/GDP, capital/GDP, agricultural land/GDP). For each six digit product in each country,
we then interact the NTB variable with the sum of all these interacted coeﬃcients to obtain the
impact that NTBs have on imports following (6) and (7).
The simple average ad-valorem equivalent in the sample for core NTBs is 9.2 percent; it is 7.8
percent when import-weighted. If averages are calculated only over tariﬀ lines aﬀected by Core
NTBs, the numbers are much higher: 39.8 and 22.7 percent, respectively. The simple and import-
weighted averages of AVEs of domestic support are much smaller. Generally below 1 percent, but
this simply reﬂects that a very small number of products are aﬀected by domestic support in most
countries (see fourth column of Table 1). If one calculates the average only over those products
aﬀected by domestic support, the sample simple average is 8.9 percent and the import-weighted
average is 8.0 percent.
These results suggest that the importance of NTBs as a protectionist tool is substantial, espe-
cially considering that in 57 percent of tariﬀ lines subject to core NTBs in our sample, the AVE of
core NTB is higher than the tariﬀ. Regarding products subject to agricultural domestic support, in
30 percent of these tariﬀ lines the AVE of agricultural domestic support is higher than the tariﬀ.16
There is also signiﬁcant variation across countries. The simple average AVE of core NTBs goes
from virtually 0 to 42 percent (from 0 to 39 percent when import weighted). Numbers for domestic
support are generally below 1 percent. The countries with the highest average AVE of core NTBs
are all low income African countries (Sudan, Algeria, Tanzania, Nigeria and Morocco). Several
middle income countries also have relatively high AVEs of core NTBs. This includes Malaysia,
Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. The countries with the highest AVEs of domestic support are all
European member countries and Peru.
In order to disentangle the large variation in AVEs across countries, we undertook a series of
simple correlation of our estimates with GDP per capita. Figure 2 plots the graph of the Log
(aveCore) on Log (GDP per capita). It suggests that the average AVE of core NTBs increases
with GDP per capita (although some middle income countries seem to have the highest AVEs of
core NTBs). Figure 3 provides the same plot but for the AVE of Domestic Support. There is
16Note that because of our empirical methodology the AVEs need to be interpreted as the marginal contribution
of core NTBs and agricultural domestic support after controlling for tariﬀ levels.
17also an upward sloping curve, but it is more striking than in the case of core NTBs (the number
of countries is also much smaller as notiﬁcations to the WTO of only 24 countries were used in
Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2004), which is our data source). Moreover, the contribution of core
NTBs and agricultural domestic support to the overall level of protection (that includes tariﬀs) also
increases with GDP per capita (see Figure 4). Thus as countries become richer the relative trade
restrictiveness of NTBs becomes more visible. However, the overall level of protection Tn,c still
decreases with GDP per capita, mainly driven by average tariﬀ levels than tend to be signiﬁcantly
lower as countries grow richer.
The variation across goods (tariﬀ lines) is also very large. The average level of AVEs in agri-
cultural products is 20 percent compared to 8 percent for manufacturing goods. The overall level
of protection (including tariﬀs) is also much higher for agriculture (38 percent versus 17 percent).
The highest average AVE of NTBs at the 2 digit level of the HS is found for dairy products (HS 4)
with an average of 38 percent (an average tariﬀ of 29 percent bring the average level of protection
for dairy products in the world to 67 percent). The lowest average AVE of NTB at the 2 digit
level of the HS is found for tin and products thereof (HS 80) with an average of 3 percent (and an
average level of overall protection of 10 percent once tariﬀs are included). Also, the contribution of
N T B st ot h eo v e r a l ll e v e lo fp r o t e c t i o ni sh i g h e ri na g r i c u l t u r e .
One question that one may ask is whether these diﬀerent instruments of protection (tariﬀs,
core NTBs and agricultural domestic support) are complements or substitutes in terms of their
trade restrictiveness. In order to answer this question, we run a simple within country regression
of tariﬀs on AVE of core NTBs and AVE of agricultural domestic support using country dummies.
The results are reported in Table 2. They suggest that (within countries) tariﬀsd ot e n dt oi n c r e a s e
with both AVE of core NTBs and agricultural domestic support, reinforcing each other, rather than
substituting for each other.
It is diﬃcult to provide external tests for our estimates as exercises providing AVEs of NTBs at
the tariﬀ line level are nonexistent to our knowledge. However, we can compare country averages
provided by Bradford (2003), which estimates AVE using price diﬀerentials for Australia, Canada,
Japan, United States and 5 European countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the
United Kingdom). These AVEs are computed using price diﬀerential between retail prices and
import prices, after correcting for transport, taxes and other distributions costs. By deﬁnition
18they include more restrictions that the Core NTBs and agricultural domestic support we estimated
because they include many other policies (e.g., exchange rate controls). Also diﬀerences in tastes
and quality across countries can partly explain diﬀerences in prices. For these reasons one should
expect them to be a bit higher (and they generally are). Our estimates compare to Bradford
(2003, Table 2) as follows: 8 percent for Australia (compared to 15 percent), 5 percent for Canada
(compared to 8 percent), 10 percent for Japan (compared with 58 percent), 8 percent for the United
States (compared with 9 percent), 13 percent in Belgium (compared to 32 percent), 10 percent in
Germany (compared to 18 percent), 10 percent in Italy (compared to 12 percent), 11 percent in
the Netherlands compared to 31 percent, and 10 percent in the United Kingdom (compared to 38
percent). There are obvious reasons why these numbers may diﬀer, but the order of magnitudes
seem more or less on line, except perhaps for Belgium, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Japan,
where Bradford’s estimates are much larger.17
Andriamananjara et al. (2004) also provide estimates of AVEs of NTBs for 12 groups of prod-
uct (that correspond to some aggregate of the GTAP product classiﬁcation). They use price data
from the Economist Intelligence Unit for 18 regions/countries and estimate the impact NTBs on
retail prices controlling for several variables capturing distribution costs (GDP per capita, distance,
wages in the non-traded sector, etc..). The most complete exercise is undertaken for Apparel. An-
driamananjara et al. (2004) estimate a simple average AVEs of NTBs in apparel across countries
of 73 percent (it varies between 16 and 190 percent). Our simple average for apparel is 20 per-
cent (it varies between 0 and 95 percent). Thus, the order of magnitude seems a bit higher in
Andriamananjara et al. 2004. This diﬀerence could be as before due to the assumption of perfect
substitution between domestically-produced and imported goods or the fact that the averages are
only reported for products for which their results were theoretically consistent ignoring other prod-
ucts. Our non-linear estimation avoids this problem and includes those products in which NTBs
may have a very small impact on imports (or domestic prices). One could therefore expect lower
AVEs than in Andriamananjara et al. (2004).
17One reason for this could be that the price comparisons in Bradford (2003) assume that domestically produced
goods and import goods are perfect substitutes, and ignores product diﬀerentiation, which could be quite signiﬁcant
in Japan. So large diﬀerences in taste can lead to large NTB estimates. The precision with which distribution margins
are calculated can also be questioned in these type of exercise. For example, all fresh, frozen or deep frozen ﬁsh is
lumped together in one product category with a single distribution markup. Given that distribution and transport
cost can vary signiﬁcantly between fresh and deep frozen ﬁsh, the composition of this aggregate product matters
when determining the markup cost.
19We also provide a test of our methodology to calculate AVEs of NTBs.18 Using the observed
tariﬀ information we created a dummy which takes the value 1 if the tariﬀ is positive and zero oth-
erwise. We then use this new dummy variable and calculated its impact on imports and proceeded
to transform the quantity impact into a price-equivalent as we did with the NTB information.19 We
then calculated the correlation between the ad-valorem equivalents for tariﬀs obtained using this
methodology and the actual tariﬀs. The correlation is 0.31 and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level
The average actual tariﬀ in the sample is 10.7 percent with a standard deviation of 23.0 percent,
whereas the ad-valorem equivalent of the tariﬀ dummy has an average of 11.3 with a standard de-
viation of 23.7 percent. Overall this suggests that the methodology we used to estimate ad-valorem
equivalent of border barriers is doing a relatively good job.
5.2 Trade restrictiveness indices
Table 3 provides our estimates of TRIs, OTRIs and MA-OTRIs for 91 countries (counting European
Union members as 1 country).20 The ﬁrst three columns provide estimates of trade restrictiveness
using tariﬀ data only. The following three columns show estimates that include both tariﬀ and
NTBs. The following two columns provide estimates of OTRI and MA-OTRI for agriculture prod-
ucts (HS 01 to 24) that include both tariﬀs and NTBs. The last two columns provide similar indices
but for manufacturing products (HS 25 to 97).
One can make several important observations. First, NTBs have a signiﬁcant contribution to
the level of trade restrictiveness. Indeed, NTBs add on average an additional 70 percent to the level
of trade restrictiveness imposed by tariﬀs. In 21 countries (out of 91) the contribution of NTBs to
the overall level of restrictiveness is higher than the contribution of tariﬀs.21 Thus neglecting the
restrictiveness of NTBs can be very misleading.
Second, and as discussed earlier, the TRI which uses welfare as a reference is always higher than
the OTRI. On average the TRI is around 70 percent higher than the OTRI (regardless of whether
we include NTBs or not). The largest diﬀerences between OTRIs and TRIs are to be found in
18We are grateful to Alan Deardorﬀ for suggesting this.
19Obviously, on the left hand side of (2) we only had log of imports, and the tariﬀ dummy was now on the
right-hand-side. To correct for its endogeneity it was instrumented using the same method used on NTBs.
20Estimates for the European Union are for extra-EU trade.
21It is also worth noting that on average the contribution of NTBs to the overall level of protection is 30 higher in
agriculture than manufacturing.
20countries where the tariﬀ variance is the highest (see Anderson and Neary, 2003 or 2004). High
income countries tend to be predominantly among those with a much higher TRI (and therefore
ah i g h e rt a r i ﬀ v a r i a n c e ) .A l lh i g hi n c o m ec o u n t r i e si no u rs a m p l ea r ei nt h et o p2 0w h e nr a n k e d
according to this criteria.
Third, agriculture protection is larger than manufacturing protection. It is on average twice as
high. In only one country in the sample the OTRI for agriculture is lower than for manufacturing
(Egypt). The MA-OTRI in agriculture, which captures the restrictiveness faced by each country
on its agriculture export bundle is on average almost 4 times as high as the MA-OTRI for man-
ufacturing. This suggests that countries which have an export bundle concentrated in agriculture
products are likely to face much more important market access problems that countries specializing
in manufacturing products.
Tables 4a to 4c provide estimates of bilateral OTRIs and MA-OTRIs (depending on whether
we are focusing on the exporting or importing region) for groups of countries: QUAD, High,
Middle and Low income countries, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Sub-Saharan African
countries excluding South Africa (SSA). Table 4a provides estimates for the combined agriculture
and manufacturing bundle; table 4b focuses on agriculture and table 4c on manufacturing. All
indices include tariﬀs and NTBs. The last row and column give the trade restrictiveness imposed
or faced by that region. The OTRI faced by the world on the world is 15 percent, but it reaches
41 percent for agriculture, again denoting the anti-agriculture biases of existing trade regimes.
Focusing on the last rows and last column of each table suggests that the middle and low income
countries impose and face the highest trade barriers in the world (this aggregates obviously hide
quite a bit of heterogeneity which is captured in the numbers provided in Table 3). Table 4a
suggests that all group of countries impose their highest trade barriers on low income countries,
but low income countries also tend to impose the high barriers on their import bundle. If one focuses
on agriculture products (Table 4b), then middle income countries face the highest barriers in the
world, and the QUAD, high income and middle income countries impose the highest agricultural
trade barriers on their import bundle. In the case of manufacturing (Table 4c), middle income and
low income countries impose signiﬁcantly higher barriers on their import bundle than high income
countries.
In order to explore how trade barriers imposed and faced by each country are associated with
21income levels, we run a simple regression of GDP per capita on OTRI and MA-OTRI in our sample
of 91 countries. The left quadrant of Figure 4 shows the partial correlation between Log of GDP
per capita and the Log of OTRI. There is a negative and statistically signiﬁcant association which
suggest that rich countries tend to impose lower trade restrictions on their import bundle. The
right quadrant of Figure 4 shows the partial correlation between Log of GDP per capita and the
Log of MA-OTRI. There is again a negative and statistical signiﬁcant correlation suggesting that
richer countries face lower trade restrictions on their export bundle. Note that the relationship
b e t w e e nt h eO T R Ia n dG D Pp e rc a p i t as e e m st ob en o n - l i n e a ri nt h eﬁrst quadrant with the OTRI
peaking for middle income countries.
It is diﬃcult to provide an external test of these indicators of trade restrictiveness as there
are no comparable numbers available across a large number of countries, except for the work of
Anderson (1998). However, Anderson’s number are for protection levels in the early 1990s and
focus exclusively on the TRI. Nevertheless, we calculated the correlation between Anderson’s TRI
numbers and our TRI indicators for the sub-sample of 27 countries in his sub-sample (see Table
A-1 on page 1125).22 The correlation is 0.65 and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The average
TRI in his sample is 0.20 whereas ours is 0.26. This is somehow suspect, given that most countries
have liberalized over the period, but it can be accounted by the fact that Anderson (1998) did not
include technical regulations as part of his NTB variable, whereas they are included in the TRI
measures in this paper.
Finally, all of the parameters used to estimate the trade restrictiveness indices were estimated
and therefore have an error associated with them. In order to have an estimate of the precision
of our trade restrictiveness indices we calculated the standard errors of the OTRI reported in
the fourth column of Table 3 as follows. For each of the estimated variables needed to construct
the OTRI (the βs of the NTB equation and the ann used to calculate the elasticities) we have a
variance-covariance matrix.23 Thus we ﬁrst draw a sample of normally distributed variables with
mean and variance-covariance equal to the point estimate and the variance-covariance matrix that
was estimated. We then randomly take 50 draws (with repetition) from this sample and calculate
the OTRI using (20). The standard error of the OTRI is then given by the standard deviation of
22Given that in Anderson (1998) the NTB data is only available for 19 of the 27 countries, we use the TRI calculated
over tariﬀs only for those countries.
23The covariance between the ann and the βs is assumed to be zero as we have estimated them separately.
22the 50 OTRIs calculated from the diﬀerent draws. Figure 5 reports the OTRI point estimates and
their bootstrapped standard errors for each of the countries in the sample. Around 40 percent of
the countries in the sample have an OTRI which is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. An additional
10 percent are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Another 20 percent is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level (countries above the diagonal line ). Thus, a third of our estimates are insigniﬁcant (those
below the diagonal line), which suggests there is some room for improving the precision of the
estimates.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The objective of this paper is to provide estimates of trade restrictiveness indices for 91 developing
and developed countries. These restrictiveness indices include measures of both tariﬀ and AVEs
of NTBs at the tariﬀ line level. Three trade restrictiveness indices are calculated that capture
diﬀerent aspects of countries’ trade regimes. The ﬁrst trade restrictiveness index, labeled TRI,
captures the trade distortions that each country’s trade policies impose on its own welfare. The
second trade restrictiveness index captures the trade restrictiveness of each country’s trade policies
on its import bundle. The third trade restrictiveness index gives an indication of the level of trade
restrictiveness faced by each country in the rest of the world on its export bundle. The latter are
estimated bilaterally with the objective of measuring the restrictiveness of trade policy regimes vis-
a-vis low-income and least-developed countries. They are also estimated for the broad disaggregates
of manufacturing and agriculture products.
Results suggests that poor countries tend to have more restrictive trade regimes, but also face
higher barriers on their export bundles. Interestingly, NTBs contribute for a large share of trade
restrictiveness across countries: on average 70 percent. This indicates the importance of addressing
NTBs in simulation exercises, but also in trade negotiations. This is particularly true for developed
countries where the importance of NTBs is stronger.
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26Table 1: Frequency ratios a
Country Tariﬀ Core NTB Simple Simple Simple Import Import Import
Year Year Frequency Frequency Frequency Weighted Weighted Weighted
ratio ratio of ratio of Frequency ratio Frequency ratio Frequency ratio
Non-Zero of Domestic Core NTB of Non-zero of Domestic of Core NTB
Tariﬀs Support Tariﬀs Support
ALB 2002 1997 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00 0.03
ARG 2002 2001 0.99 0.00 0.27 0.65 0.00 0.25
AUS 2002 1999 0.55 0.00 0.22 0.69 0.00 0.34
AUT 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.61 0.01 0.14
BEL 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.93 0.01 0.15
BFA 2003 1997 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.90 0.00 0.18
BGD 2001 2000 0.94 0.00 0.11 0.99 0.00 0.31
BHR 2003 1999 0.97 0.00 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.07
BLR 2002 1996 0.99 0.00 0.24 0.90 0.00 0.28
BOL 2002 2001 0.96 0.00 0.19 0.89 0.00 0.29
BRA 2002 2001 0.97 0.00 0.46 0.30 0.01 0.59
BRN 2002 2001 0.24 0.00 0.14 0.92 0.00 0.12
BTN 2003 1999 0.93 0.00 0.04 0.99 0.00 0.20
CAF 2003 1997 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.67 0.00 0.14
CAN 2002 2000 0.61 0.00 0.15 0.73 0.00 0.20
CHE 2004 1996 0.84 0.00 0.15 1.00 0.00 0.23
CHL 2003 2001 1.00 0.00 0.27 0.96 0.00 0.22
CHN 2002 2001 0.98 0.00 0.19 0.94 0.00 0.35
CIV 2002 2001 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.00 1.00
CMR 2002 1997 0.99 0.00 0.05 0.94 0.00 0.11
COL 2003 2001 0.99 0.01 0.51 0.58 0.03 0.53
CRI 2002 1998 0.52 0.00 0.02 0.80 0.00 0.05
CZE 2003 1999 0.81 0.00 0.06 0.72 0.00 0.08
DEU 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.74 0.01 0.16
DNK 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.97 0.02 0.30
DZA 2003 2001 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.90 0.00 1.00
ECU 2003 2001 0.98 0.00 0.30 0.99 0.00 0.38
EGY 2000 2001 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.00 1.00
ESP 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.04 0.02 0.24
EST 2003 1996 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.93 0.00 0.05
ETH 2003 1995 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.12
FIN 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.72 0.01 0.12
FRA 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.93 0.01 0.19
GAB 2002 1994 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.71 0.00 0.04
GBR 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.65 0.02 0.17
GHA 2004 1995 0.87 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.00 0.10
GNQ 2003 1998 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.77 0.00 0.02
GRC 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.64 0.02 0.16
GTM 2001 1998 0.53 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.41
HKG 2003 1994 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.55 0.00 0.11
HND 2003 1998 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.05
HUN 2003 1999 0.90 0.00 0.20 0.63 0.00 0.16
IDN 2003 1999 0.80 0.00 0.13 0.99 0.00 0.14
IND 2003 1997 0.99 0.00 0.43 0.52 0.00 0.51
IRL 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.36 0.01 0.08
ISL 2002 1996 0.29 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.00 0.11
ITA 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.82 0.01 0.22
JOR 2002 2001 0.82 0.00 0.51 0.40 0.00 0.65
JPN 2003 2001 0.56 0.00 0.32 0.40 0.01 0.42
KAZ 2000 1999 0.75 0.00 0.26 0.72 0.00 0.36
KEN 2002 1993 0.93 0.00 0.02 0.79 0.00 0.04
KGZ 2002 1998 0.87 0.00 0.02 0.79 0.00 0.01
LAO 2002 2001 1.00 0.00 0.37 0.75 0.00 0.55
LBN 2003 1999 0.63 0.00 0.31 0.57 0.00 0.44
LKA 2002 1994 0.81 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.01
LTU 2002 1999 0.26 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.21
LVA 2001 1996 0.70 0.00 0.18 1.00 0.00 0.31
MAR 2002 2001 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.02 1.00
MDA 2003 1995 0.59 0.00 0.05 0.65 0.00 0.09
MDG 2001 1995 0.62 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.00 0.06
MEX 2003 2001 0.99 0.00 0.60 0.95 0.01 0.58
MLI 2001 1995 0.99 0.00 0.07 0.98 0.00 0.15
MOZ 2003 1994 0.97 0.00 0.05 0.39 0.00 0.07
MUS 2002 1995 0.45 0.00 0.19 0.84 0.00 0.23
MWI 2001 1996 0.90 0.00 0.05 0.29 0.00 0.03
MYS 2002 2001 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
NGA 2003 2001 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.00 1.00
NIC 2002 2001 0.51 0.00 0.15 0.64 0.00 0.33
NLD 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.19 0.03 0.19
NOR 2003 1996 0.25 0.00 0.15 0.98 0.00 0.13
NPL 2003 1998 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00
NZL 2001 1999 0.45 0.00 0.39 0.92 0.00 0.53
OMN 2002 1999 0.96 0.00 0.14 1.00 0.00 0.14
PAK 2002 1998 1.00 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.29
PER 2000 2001 1.00 0.02 0.25 0.51 0.08 0.40
PHL 2003 2001 0.98 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 1.00
PNG 2001 1997 0.23 0.00 0.12 0.93 0.00 0.10
POL 2003 1999 0.96 0.00 0.14 0.80 0.00 0.22
PRT 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 1.00 0.03 0.26
PRY 2003 2001 0.99 0.00 0.35 0.91 0.00 0.40
ROM 2001 1999 0.94 0.00 0.20 0.99 0.00 0.17
RUS 2002 1997 0.99 0.00 0.39 0.90 0.00 0.63
RWA 2003 1994 0.93 0.00 0.01 0.91 0.00 0.07
SAU 2003 1999 0.97 0.00 0.16 0.99 0.00 0.16
SDN 2003 2001 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.95 0.00 1.00
SEN 2003 2001 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
SLV 2002 1997 0.54 0.00 0.39 0.92 0.00 0.32
SVN 2003 1999 0.91 0.00 0.41 0.77 0.00 0.41
SWE 2004 1999 0.83 0.01 0.29 0.96 0.01 0.17
TCD 2003 1997 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.85 0.00 0.11
THA 2001 2001 0.98 0.00 0.16 0.93 0.00 0.10
TTO 2004 1992 0.96 0.00 0.09 0.89 0.00 0.04
TUN 2004 1999 0.91 0.00 0.36 0.76 0.03 0.55
TUR 2002 1997 0.86 0.00 0.18 0.96 0.01 0.28
TZA 2004 2001 0.98 0.00 1.00 0.70 0.00 1.00
UGA 2002 1993 0.83 0.00 0.01 0.54 0.00 0.00
UKR 2003 1997 0.82 0.00 0.17 0.98 0.00 0.51
URY 2003 2001 0.98 0.00 0.51 0.86 0.02 0.54
USA 2003 1999 0.76 0.00 0.27 0.98 0.00 0.44
VEN 2003 2001 0.99 0.00 0.35 0.71 0.02 0.47
VNM 2003 2001 0.69 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
ZAF 2003 1999 0.49 0.00 0.10 0.68 0.01 0.06
ZMB 2002 1993 0.76 0.00 0.05 0.93 0.00 0.08
ZWE 2003 1997 0.94 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.15
aAll numbers are in percent, except for years in the ﬁrst two columns. The third to ﬁfth columns are simple
frequency ratio and the last three columns are import-weighted frequency ratios.Table 2: Tariﬀs and NTBs: complements or substitutes?a
Log(1+Tariﬀ)
Log(1+ AVE of Core NTBs) 0.023   
(0.004)
Log(1+ AVE of Ag. Support) 0.561   
(0.113)




aThe regression is estimated using a within estimator that takes the diﬀerences with respect to country means.
Standard errors are in parenthesis and are corrected for within HS 6 digit tariﬀ lines correlation across countries.
BBB
stands for signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level;
BB stands for signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level and
B for signiﬁcance at
the 10 percent level.Table 3: Trade Restrictiveness Indices
Country Country Tariﬀso n l y T a r i ﬀs&N T B s T a r i ﬀs&N T B s T a r i ﬀs&N T B s
code name Agriculture Manufacturing
OTRI MA-OTRI TRI OTRI MA-OTRI TRI OTRI MA-OTRI OTRI MA-OTRI
ALB Albania 0.109 0.113 0.126 0.114 0.167 0.137 0.120 0.268 0.113 0.160
ARG Argentina 0.132 0.100 0.143 0.204 0.221 0.314 0.220 0.438 0.202 0.135
AUS Australia 0.047 0.119 0.081 0.116 0.218 0.270 0.353 0.569 0.087 0.095
BFA Burkina Faso 0.110 0.128 0.128 0.149 0.191 0.245 0.362 0.485 0.107 0.076
BGD Bangladesh 0.194 0.172 0.236 0.227 0.219 0.307 0.268 0.269 0.219 0.216
BHR Bahrain 0.082 0.073 0.131 0.088 0.118 0.154 0.181 0.560 0.078 0.105
BLR Belarus 0.091 0.098 0.111 0.159 0.154 0.273 0.312 0.338 0.137 0.147
BOL Bolivia 0.087 0.102 0.091 0.147 0.220 0.247 0.355 0.436 0.114 0.144
BRA Brazil 0.126 0.116 0.143 0.262 0.175 0.411 0.385 0.431 0.244 0.106
BRN Brunei 0.095 0.081 0.461 0.139 0.126 0.497 0.410 0.097 0.126
BTN Bhutan 0.158 0.134 0.205 0.194 0.249 0.282 0.216 0.702 0.190 0.151
CAF Central Afr. Rep. 0.177 0.084 0.201 0.192 0.147 0.237 0.274 0.247 0.177 0.089
CAN Canada 0.031 0.049 0.091 0.061 0.127 0.186 0.258 0.505 0.043 0.096
CHE Switzerland 0.057 0.054 0.256 0.090 0.100 0.320 0.511 0.345 0.041 0.072
CHL Chile 0.068 0.077 0.069 0.115 0.161 0.213 0.277 0.310 0.094 0.087
CHN China 0.135 0.046 0.194 0.199 0.079 0.314 0.368 0.934 0.186 0.071
CIV Cote d’Ivoire 0.110 0.127 0.129 0.377 0.220 0.521 0.533 0.379 0.343 0.092
CMR Cameroon 0.167 0.064 0.192 0.182 0.109 0.221 0.249 0.183 0.171 0.084
COL Colombia 0.116 0.122 0.133 0.228 0.186 0.354 0.427 0.371 0.197 0.116
CRI Costa Rica 0.044 0.090 0.077 0.048 0.147 0.089 0.125 0.415 0.040 0.076
CZE Czech Rep. 0.040 0.062 0.065 0.050 0.107 0.105 0.097 0.576 0.047 0.089
DZA Algeria 0.163 0.021 0.192 0.465 0.130 0.612 0.549 0.447 0.130
ECU Ecuador 0.104 0.201 0.122 0.157 0.301 0.241 0.346 0.471 0.133 0.106
EGY Egypt 0.440 0.117 1.496 0.678 0.181 1.595 0.527 0.638 0.706 0.119
EST Estonia 0.011 0.093 0.057 0.023 0.153 0.105 0.104 0.374 0.012 0.130
ETH Ethiopia 0.157 0.084 0.203 0.162 0.159 0.217 0.174 0.405 0.160 0.075
EUN European Union 0.030 0.084 0.100 0.126 0.151 0.331 0.453 0.343 0.075 0.122
GAB Gabon 0.168 0.020 0.192 0.171 0.033 0.201 0.239 0.156 0.158 0.030
GHA Ghana 0.143 0.072 0.185 0.174 0.132 0.258 0.373 0.266 0.140 0.079
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 0.158 0.024 0.182 0.161 0.067 0.189 0.253 0.425 0.148 0.047
GTM Guatemala 0.065 0.173 0.096 0.143 0.254 0.274 0.407 0.400 0.103 0.190
HKG Hong Kong 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.014 0.124 0.097 0.131 0.322 0.006 0.105
HND Honduras 0.068 0.162 0.094 0.079 0.236 0.132 0.159 0.332 0.062 0.168
HUN Hungary 0.061 0.076 0.095 0.113 0.133 0.236 0.372 0.455 0.095 0.100
IDN Indonesia 0.056 0.066 0.106 0.098 0.145 0.234 0.341 0.324 0.061 0.129
IND India 0.300 0.139 0.336 0.399 0.213 0.508 0.650 0.540 0.368 0.149
ISL Iceland 0.032 0.054 0.152 0.056 0.104 0.224 0.256 0.175 0.028 0.069
JOR Jordan 0.127 0.107 0.179 0.244 0.153 0.387 0.240 1.009 0.244 0.103
JPN Japan 0.058 0.050 0.344 0.143 0.081 0.474 0.580 0.073 0.081
KAZ Kazkhstan 0.054 0.057 0.083 0.140 0.153 0.269 0.329 0.624 0.117 0.112
KEN Kenya 0.137 0.103 0.188 0.144 0.179 0.206 0.225 0.390 0.132 0.087
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 0.069 0.118 0.113 0.074 0.192 0.129 0.100 0.349 0.070 0.087
LAO Lao People’s DR 0.115 0.174 0.152 0.248 0.235 0.382 0.288 0.382 0.241 0.219
LBN Lebanon 0.055 0.088 0.101 0.142 0.157 0.296 0.459 0.404 0.077 0.106
LKA Sri Lanka 0.083 0.167 0.158 0.085 0.220 0.160 0.207 0.244 0.064 0.217
LTU Lithuania 0.020 0.145 0.064 0.050 0.230 0.164 0.203 0.417 0.033 0.165
LVA Latvia 0.030 0.108 0.075 0.098 0.200 0.247 0.366 0.364 0.058 0.153
MAR Morocoo 0.254 0.092 0.316 0.509 0.144 0.642 0.710 0.294 0.478 0.115
MDA Moldova 0.047 0.171 0.165 0.074 0.259 0.221 0.168 0.433 0.057 0.180
MDG Madagascar 0.039 0.150 0.060 0.045 0.223 0.082 0.046 0.357 0.045 0.168
MEX Mexico 0.148 0.045 0.205 0.287 0.084 0.440 0.550 0.251 0.261 0.077
MLI Mali 0.108 0.036 0.125 0.140 0.075 0.207 0.282 0.251 0.115 0.052
MOZ Mozambique 0.105 0.140 0.136 0.138 0.243 0.207 0.297 0.405 0.097 0.089
MUS Mauritius 0.143 0.123 0.270 0.199 0.185 0.359 0.346 0.496 0.171 0.112
MWI Malawi 0.107 0.171 0.139 0.142 0.263 0.214 0.281 0.418 0.114 0.200
MYS Malaysia 0.061 0.041 0.262 0.260 0.079 0.476 0.553 0.341 0.236 0.067
NGA Nigeria 0.253 0.028 0.350 0.550 0.054 0.700 0.786 0.159 0.502 0.044
NIC Nicaragua 0.045 0.197 0.076 0.101 0.304 0.228 0.384 0.463 0.053 0.175
NOR Norway 0.046 0.030 0.287 0.075 0.095 0.358 0.681 0.275 0.010 0.082
NPL Nepal 0.157 0.103 0.389 0.157 0.171 0.390 0.240 0.304 0.144 0.152
NZL New Zealand 0.024 0.117 0.054 0.127 0.226 0.295 0.313 0.405 0.104 0.119
OMN Oman 0.101 0.061 0.214 0.156 0.094 0.316 0.586 0.321 0.067 0.080
PAK Pakistan 0.171 0.183 0.229 0.210 0.276 0.313 0.470 0.659 0.174 0.196
PER Peru 0.130 0.108 0.134 0.198 0.165 0.294 0.426 0.474 0.161 0.069
PHL Philippines 0.040 0.062 0.073 0.240 0.094 0.410 0.477 0.649 0.212 0.060
PNG Papua N. Guinea 0.062 0.106 0.256 0.103 0.176 0.318 0.349 0.387 0.058 0.039
POL Poland 0.108 0.082 0.192 0.152 0.138 0.284 0.515 0.477 0.114 0.108
PRY Paraguay 0.116 0.188 0.130 0.211 0.300 0.329 0.392 0.448 0.181 0.112
ROM Romania 0.119 0.088 0.157 0.158 0.157 0.242 0.360 0.544 0.135 0.137
RUS Russia 0.104 0.043 0.124 0.226 0.122 0.355 0.334 0.467 0.204 0.097
RWA Rwanda 0.093 0.060 0.118 0.102 0.113 0.147 0.125 0.342 0.097 0.094
SAU Saudi Arabia 0.067 0.026 0.112 0.108 0.035 0.221 0.153 0.550 0.100 0.032
SDN Sudan 0.194 0.107 0.233 0.480 0.165 0.609 0.495 0.466 0.477 0.037
SEN Senegal 0.097 0.092 0.118 0.360 0.167 0.506 0.573 0.231 0.305 0.090
SLV El Salvador 0.065 0.175 0.103 0.150 0.237 0.270 0.154 0.527 0.150 0.175
SVN Slovenia 0.098 0.080 0.118 0.182 0.139 0.298 0.483 0.664 0.152 0.138
TCD Tchad 0.157 0.104 0.180 0.164 0.176 0.191 0.239 0.269 0.155 0.073
THA Thailand 0.130 0.093 0.195 0.153 0.140 0.259 0.579 0.675 0.112 0.084
TTO Trinidad and T. 0.075 0.061 0.281 0.086 0.158 0.301 0.380 0.504 0.054 0.117
TUN Tunisia 0.249 0.096 0.345 0.367 0.136 0.523 0.941 0.342 0.293 0.129
TUR Turkey 0.071 0.101 0.197 0.118 0.162 0.273 0.397 0.480 0.087 0.121
TZA Tanzania 0.139 0.134 0.164 0.435 0.229 0.581 0.686 0.471 0.396 0.067
UGA Uganda 0.079 0.070 0.095 0.080 0.139 0.099 0.119 0.268 0.074 0.093
UKR Ukraine 0.093 0.071 0.299 0.216 0.152 0.454 0.464 0.492 0.184 0.114
URY Uruguay 0.114 0.166 0.131 0.239 0.265 0.372 0.384 0.452 0.216 0.127
USA United States 0.027 0.051 0.053 0.082 0.111 0.215 0.205 0.480 0.068 0.070
VEN Venezuela 0.127 0.062 0.145 0.212 0.107 0.323 0.455 0.252 0.173 0.063
VNM Vietnam 0.160 0.157 0.259 0.368 0.238 0.509 0.541 0.535 0.349 0.170
ZAF South Africa 0.072 0.084 0.137 0.089 0.143 0.182 0.197 0.504 0.076 0.095
ZMB Zambia 0.099 0.099 0.128 0.117 0.170 0.178 0.295 0.434 0.093 0.087
ZWE Zimbabwe 0.164 0.131 0.226 0.191 0.216 0.283 0.414 0.372 0.161 0.099Table 4a: Bilateral OTRI or MA-OTRI: Agriculture and Manufacturing
Importers
Exporters QUAD High Inc. Middle Inc. Low Inc. LDC SSA World
Quad 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.14
High Income 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.14
Middle Income 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.15
Low Income 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.20
LDC 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.18
SSA 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.17
World 0.10 0.09 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.15
Table 4b: Bilateral OTRI or MA-OTRI: Agriculture
Importers
Exporters QUAD High Inc. Middle Inc. Low Inc. LDC SSA World
Quad 0.30 0.31 0.46 0.37 0.29 0.34 0.37
High Income 0.34 0.29 0.46 0.36 0.28 0.34 0.38
Middle Income 0.49 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.28 0.33 0.43
Low Income 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.34 0.27 0.31 0.39
LDC 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.32 0.26 0.30 0.37
SSA 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.26 0.30 0.35
World 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.35 0.28 0.33 0.41
Table 4c: Bilateral OTRI or MA-OTRI: Manufacturing
Importers
Exporters QUAD High Inc. Middle Inc. Low Inc. LDC SSA World
Quad 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.11
High Income 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.10
Middle Income 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.11
Low Income 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.13
LDC 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.12
SSA 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.09
World 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.11Figure 1: Distribution of R-squares of import equations (equation (5))
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